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CHRISTIANITY
AND THE CRIMINAL
ROBERT F. DRINAN, S.J.*
W E OFTEN FAIL to realize in modem times that Anglo-American
criminal law was formed and fashioned almost as it is today, a
few decades after the Norman conquest of England in 1066. Bishop
Bracton, a Catholic prelate and jurist, wrote the first book in the English
language on criminal law in the thirteenth century and his volume needs
no substantial revision to be as valuable a text today as it was seven
centuries ago.
The central principle in Bishop Bracton's treatise is the idea that
no one may be punished or held accountable for a crime unless he
intended to perform the act in question knowing it to be evil. If the
person acted by mistake or unintentionally or without "mens rea,"
he cannot be treated as a criminal since no moral fault can be imputed
to him. This principle has become the fixed star in the constellation of
our criminal jurisprudence. In recent years the highest tribunal of the
nation, unanimously reversing the decision of a federal trial and appel-
late court, had occasion to restate the proposition that a citizen cannot
be made a criminal until and unless it is demonstrated beyond any
reasonable doubt that he had the intention knowingly to do wrong.
The Court stated: "It is . . . the dictate of natural justice that to con-
stitute guilt there must be not only a wrongful act but a criminal
intention."
During the last few decades two opposing forces have been operating
on this idea of personal imputability as the prerequisite for criminal
responsibility. On the one hand many factions in modern society are
seeking to erode the necessity of proving individual guilt as the indis-
pensable foundation of personal punishment. The complexity of modern
society and the difficulties involved in establishing the evil intentions
of a lawbreaker have persuaded federal and state legislators to make
*A.B. (1942), M.A. (1947), Boston College; LL.B. (1949), LL.M. (1950),
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the mere violation of a statute a punishable
crime regardless of the intent or motivation
of the lawbreaker. Thus the illegal posses-
sion of narcotics, the selling of liquor to
minors or the sale of adulterated foods are,
under some statutes, crimes punishable for
their commission even if the doer was abso-
lutely free of personal guilt. Such "public
policy" statutes are designed to simplify
and facilitate the elimination of certain
evils, but the growth of these laws - much
more rapid in America than in England -
is a dangerous tendency contrary to the
basic instincts of that Anglo-American
sense of justice which dictates that pun-
ishment should fit the criminal as well as
it fits the crime. As a federal court has
stated: "Our collective conscience does not
allow, punishment where it cannot impose
blame."' Even though "public policy" stat-
utes are, perhaps understandably, sought
after by law enforcement agencies, since
only twelve percent of all the criminals in
the United States are apprehended and ar-
rested, yet this basic departure in our crimi-
nal law from the necessity of moral guilt is
a risky thing even if it seems to bring more
efficiency in crime prevention.
A second force, however, has been oper-
ating on recent Anglo-American thinking
about criminal justice. This force derives
from the new behavioural sciences which
have revealed to us the depths of the soul
of man, both his conscious and unconscious
life. Up until about a century ago it was
presumed that a man who was neither an
infant nor an insane person knew the differ-
ence between moral right and wrong, and
that he must be punished if he did wrong
knowing it to be wrong. This principle, a
traditional cornerstone of Anglo-American
'Holloway v. United States, 148 F.2d 665,
666-67 (D.C. Cir. 1945).
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criminal law, was enunciated in classic form
in .the McNaughten Rule2 - before the
House of Lords in 1843 -a rule later
adopted by every state in the union. The
rule states simply that the accused's state
of mind - his knowledge of right and
wrong in what he did - is a question not
for expert psychiatrists testifying at the trial
but for a jury of the defendant's peers.
Since the adoption of the deceptively
simple "right and wrong" test of the
McNaughten case, reliable authorities have
definitely established that there are indi-
viduals who, although they know an act to
be morally and legally wrong, are nonethe-
less necessitated to perform this act by some
inner irresistible compulsion. It is for this
reason that seventeen of our states allow the
defense of "irresistible impulse" in certain
criminal cases. Such a defense is permitted
because no just government can punish a
man if he did not freely choose to indulge in
the anti-social conduct of which he is con-
victed.
But how free must a person be to be pun-
ished justly for his crime? That is the central
question in criminal jurisprudence today!
At what point is the power to elect evil
destroyed by the neuroses or psychoses or
compulsions that dominate us, more per-
haps than we realize? At what point is the
light of freedom, and thus, imputability,
darkened by the powerful forces of irra-
tionality within us?
This question is not an academic dispute
to be left to conferences between lawyers
and psychiatrists. For nothing is more un-
just than to convict a man of crime when
pity is more deserved than punishment. If
a person has been led into evil by compul-
sive forces which he is powerless to over-
2 McNaughten's Case, 10 Cl. & F. 200, 8
Eng. Rep. 718 (H.L. 1843).
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come, no matter how much he resists, is
it not an injustice crying to Heaven for
vengeance to penalize him for conduct to
which he may well have offered heroic
resistance?
In our day the law has confronted
head-on this question of persons acting
upon inner forces that are compulsive even
though the person knows them to be wrong.
Further confusing this profoundly difficult
problem is the frequent case of a criminal
acting with some initial malice which, be-
cause of certain compulsive drives within
him, merges into madness.
On July 1, 1954, the Circuit Court for
the District of Columbia adopted a new
formula to test the sanity or insanity of one
accused of crime. The Washington court
stated in Durham v. United States3 that an
accused is not guilty if his action is the
product of a mental disease or defect. In
this now famous Durham decision, a judge
allowed psychiatrists to testify as to the
manifestly abnormal mental history of the
defendant. The judge then put to the jury
the question whether the accused's criminal
conduct was the product of any mental
disease or defect with which he was afflicted.
Hence, even if the jury felt that the accused
elected wrong knowing it to be wrong, the
jury could acquit the defendant if, in the
jury's opinion, his conduct was the "prod-
uct" of a mental disease or defect.
The Durham Rule has been everywhere
rejected as unsatisfactory - by the Court
of Military Appeals and by the Supreme
Court of Indiana, to name but two tribunals
- but the hard core of truth on which the
Durham decision rested remains, namely,
the fact that certain mental defects incite
and even impel persons to do evil even
8 214 F.2d 862 (D.C. Cir. 1954).
though they know it to be wrong. The
Durham case has been severely criticized,
and rightly so, as too ambiguous and too
dangerous to be accepted as a general rule.
For example, does a mental "disease" in-
clude everything from a mild neurasthenia
to an organic psychosis? And does a mental
"defect" cover the spectrum from inherited
moronity to a slight, acquired emotional
disorder? And who can say that the wide-
spread application of the Durham Rule
would not result in the acceptance of the
saying of the ultra-modernist that: "In the
new world we are -building there are no
criminals; there are only the victims of
inadequate social services."
Furthermore, if every crime resulting
from mental disease - and psychiatrists
would never be in agreement as to the
element of causation - is to be excused,
what of the numerous persons who are
guilty to some extent in bringing about
their own mental disease? The alcoholic,
the dope addict and the sex deviate may
have contributed to their mental sickness
by their own lack of self-control, by their
own resistance to the grace of God which
is always sufficient to overcome any tempta-
tion. Can the law seek to enter the labyrinth
of the minds of persons who are mentally
unbalanced in order to determine whether
full punishment is allowable or whether
punishment should be mitigated because
they are victims of inner compulsive forces
of which they are guilty only in cause?
A criminal law that is consistent with
Christianity must undertake this enor-
mously complex task of discovering and
punishing the culpable, and of excusing
and curing the compulsive. In fact, Anglo-
American law has- been committed to that
task ever since the days of Bishop Bracton
and the historic dictum, actus non facit
malum nisi mens sit rea - an act is not
criminal unless the mind is guilty.
In one particular form of wrongdoing,
the attaching of culpability is an especially
difficult problem. Crimes of passion result-
ing from man's second strongest instinct
have always darkened the pages of history.
American law has always forbidden all
illicit sexual relations under penalty of
severe sanctions. During the last two dec-
ades, however, the laws of fifteen states,
including Massachusetts, have been modi-
fied to delay or prevent the punishment and
to order the treatment of those unfortunate
persons whom physicians and psychiatrists
determine to be sex deviates or sex psy-
chotics. Most of these laws have been the
product of public indignation at shocking
crimes sensationalized by an irresponsible
press. A recent survey showed that almost
every one of these laws, presumably capable
of protecting society from sexual psycho-
paths, has been largely inoperative.
The first sexual psychopath law in Massa-
chusetts was enacted in 1947. 4 Its language
was taken almost verbatim from the Minne-
sota Sexual Psychopath Law5 and contained
features which were so severely criticized
that the law was substantially amended in
195416 Under the 1947 law, for example,
a person adjudged to be a sexual deviate
could be committed to a state institution
by the Department of Mental Health for
an indeterminate period of time, even
though he was not charged with any crime.
No adequate treatment center was estab-
lished and the procedure for commitment
was so ambiguous that only one person was
committed under the 1947 law during the
first five years of its operation. The 1954
4 MASS. ANN. LAWS C. 123A §§1-6 (1949).
5 MINN. STAT. ANN. §§526.09-526.11 (1947).
6 MASS. ANN. LAWS c. 123A §§1-10 (Supp. 1956).
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changes dropped the undefinable term "sex-
ual psychopath," provided for a treatment
center for those committed after conviction
of a crime, and specified that the law would
not be operative until the Commissioner of
Mental Health determined that ,the treat-
ment center was adequately staffed to carry
out the purposes of the law.7 The 1954
statute likewise provided that a person
convicted of a crime as a sex offender could
be sentenced to the center for treatment
and rehabilitation, but that this sentehce
could, in no event, be ". . . for a period in
excess of that provided- by the sentence
imposed upon him for the crime com-
mitted."8
Since the treatment center envisioned by
the 1954 law was never set up, it is impos-
sible therefore to judge the effectiveness of
that statute. A 1957 amendment to the
Massachusetts "sex offender" law provides
for the commitment of sexual deviates to an
indeterminate sentence but makes no finan-
cial provision for a treatment center. Its
possible effectiveness remains a large ques-
tion mark. It is to be hoped that this new
amendment will make effective the Massa-
chusetts sexual psychopath law which has
been almost totally unused, and perhaps
was unusable, during the first ten years of
its existence.
The efforts of fifteen states to provide a
legal twilight zone between sanity and in-
sanity in the case of sex offenders is an
admirable, if as yet a generally unsuccess-
ful, attempt to care for persons who are
only partially responsible for their actions.
But the law's groping attempts to measure
human accountability and to shield abnor-
mal persons from the harshness of criminal
7 Id §1.
8 ld. §4.
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penalties is but another attempt to spell out
in our law the unalterable truth that it is a
barbarous thing to inflict punishment on
those who could not have intended evil
when they performed an act in itself a
crime.
At some far future time mankind may
develop an IBM machine to assess a per-
son's motivation - to measure the amounts
of malice and madness so often mixed in
every outburst of anti-social conduct. But
until that golden age arrives, the criminal
law must continue to punish the truly mali-
cious, correct and guide the partially re-
sponsible, and try to cure the irresponsible.
In that process those subjectively innocent
will sometimes be mistakenly punished and
the truly reprobate will not infrequently be
erroneously classified as mentally ill. It is
especially for this reason - the fallibility of
human justice - that every Christian should
be dedicated, personally and intensely, to
those sentenced to prison for their delicts,
as these persons may be far less culpable
than we realize.
In the ultimate analysis, it is well to recall
that no one can, with more than high
probability, pinpoint the imputability of a
certain person for a certain act. Lawyers
and psychiatrists will differ on their defini-
tions of responsibility, but, even if they
concurred in every way, who but God is to
say that one accused of crime was morally
guilty and not merely led astray by inherited
or environmental circumstances beyond his
control? And it is precisely because of the
veritable impossibility of imputing guilt
that we should be dedicated to every pris-
oner in a very special way'. For it may well
be that he is being punished for delicts to
which he was almost irresistibly predis-
posed by the accidents of his temperament
and the vehemence of his temptations. It is
quite possible that many prisoners - per-
haps most - are punished far more severely
than their actual culpability deserves.
DEVELOPMENT OF INTERGOVERN-
* MENTAL COLLABORATION IN
MIGRATION (Continued)
may affect intergovernmental action in this
area in the future remains to be seen. Many
of the governments of immigration coun-
tries call attention to the fact that inter-
national bodies like ICEM have, perhaps
understandably, been preoccupied in the
past with the problems of the emigration
countries in Europe and should turn in-
creasing attention to the problems of the
receiving countries in securing the early
adjustment of the migrant to his new
cultural and economic environment. This
interest, if aroused, would constitute a
further step in planned migration. Certainly
it can be said that the Council of ICEM,
consisting of representatives of all twenty-
seven government members who meet twice
annually at Geneva, provides a promising
forum and opportunity for governments to
coordinate planning for emigration and
immigration. Through the medium of the
Council's discussions the plans and policies
of individual governments will become bet-
ter known to other governments and such
awareness will inevitably add to the general
knowledge of world conditions in which
migration takes place.
